The optimum size of public education spending: panel data evidence by Trofimov, Ivan D.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The optimum size of public education
spending: panel data evidence
Trofimov, Ivan D.
Kolej Yayasan Saad (KYS) Business School
17 May 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/106847/
MPRA Paper No. 106847, posted 29 Mar 2021 09:39 UTC
 1 





The paper examines the presence of positive effect of public education spending in a panel 
of 50 developed, developing and transition economies (over the 1980-2012 period) on the 
level and growth of output, and, provided such effect holds, considers the optimal provision 
of public education spending. The econometric methodology relies on panel unit root and 
cross-sectional dependence tests, panel regression with fixed effects, and panel quantile 
model with fixed effects. It is demonstrated that public education spending is productive at 
the margin under alternative specifications, and has positive externalities on the private 
economy, while the factor productivity in the government sector is higher than in the private. 
For the panel as a whole, the public education tended to be under-provided (the optimal 
level of 5.05% of GDP compared to the actual average level of 4.14% of GDP); however, the 
over-provision is observed in the slow-growing economies in the lower quantiles. 
JEL Classification: C33, H52, I25 
Keywords: Education expenditure; growth; government size, developing countries 
Introduction 
The relationship between public expenditure and economic and social outcomes has been 
subject to extensive research in economics and social and political sciences. The literature 
considered a number of dimensions of the problem, including (but not limited to): the 
causality between public expenditure and growth, with Keynesian view of expenditure 
affecting output contrasted with Wagnerian view of the reverse causality (Magazzino, 2012); 
the non-linearities in the relationship, exemplified by the Armey-Rahn curve that indicates 
possible negative effects of the expenditure on output beyond some expenditure level 
(Armey, 1995; Magazzino, Forte, 2010); the (in-)efficiency of government expenditure, i.e. 
(in-)ability of government expenditure to bring necessary social outcomes (Tanzi, 
Schuknecht, 1997; Gupta, Verhoeven, 2001), among other issues. 
From empirical and policy standpoint, the identification of the optimal size of the 
government as well as over- or under-provision of the government expenditure is very much 
a practical task, given the undesirable tendencies that have been observed in recent decades: 
the rapid size of government expenditure, tax burden and public debt, the imbalance in the 
growth of public and private sector, the rise and entrenchment of bureaucracy, the growing 
influence of vested interests (Baumol, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; De Witte, Moesen, 2010: 39; 
Facchini, Melki, 2011: 2).     
As far as the level of (government) education expenditure is concerned, alongside the 
positive developments, such as growing literacy and school enrollments, reduction of child 
mortality (Gupta, Verhoeven, 2001), poverty (Grubb, Michelson, 1974), increase in private 
investment and capital accumulation (Levy, Clements, 1996), offsetting stagnation in labour 
force growth (Annabi et al, 2011), and enhancement of nation’s human capital (Jurges, 
Schneider, 2004), brought by sustained public spending on education, the negative 
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phenomena are present. These are the over-expansion of education that is not supported by 
employment opportunities and economic development, particularly in the less developed 
economies (Mugaju, 1991), the crowding put of private education investment (Dissou et al, 
2016: 20), distortion in the composition of education spending (Su, 2004), to name a few.   
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical estimate of the optimal size of the 
public expenditure on education, without engaging in the in-depth analysis of the factors 
responsible for education expenditure growth. The study uses the panel of 50 economies 
belonging to the high, middle and low income groups in several regions. The study period 
covers the recent decades, specifically 1981-2012 period. Two econometric techniques are 
employed: the fixed effects panel OLS estimation of the aggregate production function in 
growth terms, with marginal productivity of government spending on education and the size 
of the education expenditure as regressors; and panel quantile model with fixed effects, to 
capture the heterogeneities in the effect of education expenditure on growth. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of the Armey-Rahn 
hypothesis, its theoretical base and the relevant empirical studies. Section 2 discusses the 
methodological issues, describes the model and the data. Section 3 presents empirical 
results. Section 4 provides the summary of findings.  
Literature review 
The type of the relationship that exists between government expenditure and output has 
been subject to extensive theoretical and empirical research that has been conducted in a 
variety of settings, using a variety of econometric techniques. Two groups of studies can be 
distinguished.  
The first group examines the presence of Armey curve, that represents the non-linear 
relationship between the government expenditure and the output - positive up until certain 
point (the so-called ‘Scully point’), and negative beyond this point (Scully, 1994; Armey, 
1995). The optimum levels of government expenditure at ‘Scully point’ ranged from as low 
as 10.8-15.9% of GDP in the East and South-East Asian economies (Chiou-Wei et al, 2010) to 
as high as 35.4-43.5% of GDP in the EU economies (Magazzino, Forte, 2010). The estimates 
likewise varied a lot depending on the type of the economy (developed, transition or 
developing), the historical period, specification of the models and other factors, thereby 
precluding the making of generalisations in relation to the ‘typical’ optimal level of 
expenditure or elevating the Armey curve hypothesis to the level of economic law. On the 
other hand, the optimum levels of expenditure in the developed economies are likely to be 
lower than those in the developing economies and respectively the over-provision of the 
actual government expenditure beyond the optimal level in the former group of economies 
is also likely to be common (Magazzino, Forte, 2010: 38-39).  
The studies typically focused on the total expenditure as a regressor, however, some of the 
authors considered disaggregated expenditure (Vedder, Gallaway, 1998, and Miller, 2008). 
The models included GDP and expenditure in levels or in logarithms, used GDP growth or 
GDP per capita as dependent variable, introduced lags of the dependent variable, and 
experimented with a range of control variables (openness, consumption and investment 
share of GDP, population, tax rates, employment, among others). 
Regarding adopted econometric methods, the studies used time series models (Facchini, 
Melki, 2011 for France during 1871-2008 period, and Magazzino, 2008 for Italy during 
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1862-1998 period); threshold panel models (Hajamini, Ali Falahi, 2014); dynamic smooth 
transition autoregressive (STAR) model (Chiou-Wei et al, 2010); data envelopment analysis 
(De Witte, Moesen, 2010); (panel) Granger causality (Wu et al, 2010); panel OLS and 2SLS 
(Angelopoulos et al, 2008); panel cointegration (Ghose, Das, 2013); instrumental variable 
estimations (Afonso, Furseri, 2010); panel models with fixed and random effects 
(Romero-Avila, Strauch, 2008; Folster, Henrekson, 2001); constrained non-linear regression 
(Chao, Grubel, 1998).  
The second group of studies (that are used as methodological template in this paper) did not 
attempt to detect non-linearities in the output-expenditure relationship, but instead 
concerned with the marginal product and output elasticity of government services (Karras, 
1996, 1997), the externality effects of government spending, and the factor productivity 
differentials between government- and non-government sectors (Ram, 1986). These issues 
were examined using the aggregate production function framework for the total economy 
(in Karras and the subsequent research), or using the production function for the economy 
partitioned into the government- and non-government sector, the former having externality 
effect on the latter (the studies that followed the original paper by Ram). The OLS models 
with one- or two-way fixed effects, generalised least squares, as well as random coefficients 
models were the econometric techniques used to this end. 
The empirical results were as follows.  
The early study by Karras (1996), that examined 118 developed and developing economies in 
five geographical regions (Europe, Asia, Africa, South and North America) over the 1960-85 
period, identified significant productivity of government services, over-provision of 
government services in Africa, under-provision in Asia and optimal provision in other regions, 
the negative relationship between the marginal productivity of government spending and 
government size, and the average optimal level of spending at 23% of GDP (ranging from 
14% in the high income economies to 33% in South America).  
In a sample of 20 European economies over 1950-90 period, Karras (1997) reached similar 
conclusions regarding productivity of government spending and its relationship to the 
government size, and similar level of optimal spending - 16% of GDP (+/- 3%), with the actual 
expenditure levels during the period generally being below that level (with the exception of 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK).  
Aly and Strazicich (2000) considered a group of five Persian Gulf economies (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates), individually and as a panel, over the 
1970-92 period. The labour inputs and government expenditure were found to be 
productive, while capital inputs unproductive. While the actual size of government spending 
during the period was in the 17-29% range, the optimal levels were found to be much lower 
(9% of GDP for the whole panel, and as low as 0% and 2% in Oman and Saudi Arabia, the 
figures that warrant further explanation).  
Alleyne et al (2004) focused on Caribbean economies, using annual data for the 1975-2002 
period. The government services were found to positively affect economic growth in this 
regional group, while the optimal size of the government stood at 13.0% of GDP for the 
whole group (well below the average level of 19.3% during the whole period), and 11.9%, 
26.4% and 28.0% for Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Belize respectively (reflecting the 
structural economic and systemic differences in the political economic system across the 
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economies in the same region - social democracy and strong service sector in Barbados, 
versus liberal democracy and weak services in Trinidad and Tobago).  
Zhang and Li (2008) examined the provision of rural (as opposed to purely agricultural) 
expenditure in China over 1980-2005 period. The results demonstrated positive effect of 
rural spending on GDP and the significant under-provision of the rural expenditure despite 
its gradual increase over the years (the optimal level of 13.2% of rural GDP versus the actual 
expenditure fluctuating between 2% and 6% of rural GDP), indicating the need to upscale 
rural spending to correct urban-rural imbalances.  
The output effects of government spending, the relevant externalities and inter-sectoral 
productivity differentials based on a two-sector production function were first examined 
empirically by Ram (1986). Using a sample of 115 market economies during the 1960-80 
period, the author unequivocally established positive effects of the spending on output in all 
periods and in a vast majority of economies in question (but particularly in the low-income 
economies). The positive externality effects on the rest of the economy were likewise 
pervasive (increasing over the 1970s), while the inter-sectoral productivity differentials were 
the most pronounced in the 1960s. 
Gunalp and Gur (2002) confirmed Ram’s findings in many respects, using the data for the 
1979-1997 period; however, a large number of negative relationships were found for the 
Latin American and African economies, reflecting the macroeconomic and political economic 
challenges that these countries faced during the period (debt crisis of the 1980s, slack 
economic reforms and political instability). 
The recent study by Saez et al (2017) likewise illustrated the country- and region-specific 
differences that underpin the government spending effects: the positive relationship 
between the variables was found on only a handful of European economies during the 
1994-2012 period (Portugal and the UK), alongside the negative (Austria, Finland, Italy, and 
Sweden) or insignificant ones (Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Spain). 
As far as the relationship between education expenditure and output (and its growth), as 
well as the optimality of this type of expenditure are concerned, the economic theory 
hypothesizes positive effects of human capital and education for growth, established due to 
rising marginal productivity in the economy, increase in innovative capacity, and positive 
spillover benefits (Schultz, 1961; Nelson, Phelps, 1966; Romer, 1990).  
As surveyed by Neycheva (2010: 143), methodologically, the empirical studies used literacy 
rate, the level of educational attainment, the years of schooling, performance at 
international science tests or national average IQ scores as a proxy for human capital stock 
(Cohen, Soto, 2007; Jones, Schneider, 2006). An alternative approach is to use of public 
outlays on education as a proxy for human capital, on the assumption that such outlays are 
productive (Glomm, Ravikumar, 1998; Neycheva, 2010: 145).  
With regard to modelling and estimation methods, the studies used OLS models or extended 
aggregate production functions with public education expenditure as one of the regressors 
(Neycheva, 2010); general equilibrium models to examine economic effects of government 
education expenditure by accounting for structural features of the economy (Jung, 
Thorbecke, 2003); Granger causality, cointegation, VAR/VECM or simultaneous equations 
models to establish causality between human capital or education expenditure on one hand 
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and economic outcomes on the other (Freire-Seren, 2001; Islam et al, 2007; De 
Meulemeester, Rochat, 1995); overlapping generation models that consider consumption, 
investment and optimal allocation of resources decisions during human capital formation 
process (Tran-Nam et al, 1995). 
The following results emerge from empirical research. Firstly, the causality between 
education (expenditure) and human capital on one hand and economic variables on the 
other is likely to be bi-directional (Francis, Iyare, 2006; Freire-Seren, 2001; Islam et al, 2007). 
Secondly, the effects on growth are mixed: positive (Behabib, Spiegel, 1994), negative 
(Pritchett, 2001), or insignificant (Nonnenman, Vanhoudt, 1996). The mixed findings may be 
attributed to differential quality of schooling; the differences in stock and flow of human 
capital; the varying effects across education levels (with primary and secondary education, 
as opposed to tertiary, having the most significant and positive effects on economic 
outcomes); the influence of other control variables and intermediate variables, such as 
health, or physical capital; interplay between education outlays and labour productivity; the 
economic structure, development level, focus and goals of education systems, institutional 
inertia, among other factors (Neycheva, 2010: 143-4; Islam, 1995; Krueger, Lindhal, 1999; 
Bosworth, Collins, 2003; Qi, 2016).  
We note, that in contrast to studies that attempt to establish the optimal level of aggregate 
expenditure, the work on the optimal level of education expenditure is lacking, the 
shortcoming that we try to address in this paper.  
Methodology 
Model 
For the purpose of modelling, we relied on studies by Ram (1986) and Karras (1996, 1997).  
The former type of studies examined the sign and significance of government expenditure 
on GDP growth, the presence of positive (or negative) externalities from the government 
expenditure and the productivity effects of the government sector vis-a-vis productivity of 
the non-government sector. The latter type of studies attempts to determine whether the 
government expenditure is optimally provided (with the marginal product of expenditure 
equal to unity), or conversely is under- or over-provided. 
Ram (1986: 192) divides the total economy into the government (G ) and non-government 
( C ) sectors with the following production functions: 
 GKLCC cc ,,                                                    (1) 
and 
 
gg KLGG ,                                                      (2) 
,where the respective outputs depend on labour and capital inputs, and additionally the 
government sector having externality effect on the non-government sector. The inputs and 
outputs on the two sectors add up to make a total economic input and output, i.e. 
LLL gc  , KKK gc  , and GCY  . 










G                                             ( 3 ) 
,where 0  is an indicator of higher productivity in the government sector (and 0  in 













The aggregate growth equation (Specification 1) is then given as: 




IY    '                                 ( 4 ) 
,where    represents growth rate of the respective variable;  ,  ,   are parameters 
to be estimated;    1/'  with   being inter-sectoral productivity differential; I  is 
a proxy for change in the capital stock from year t  to year 1t ;   is the marginal 
product of K  in sector C ;   is elasticity of C  with respect to L ; and  
C
GCG  is 
the elasticity of the non-government sector output with respect to G .  
Following Ram (1986), we considered two additional specifications, derived from Equation 
(4). 
In Specification 2,  ' , and Equation (4) reduces to: 
  GL
Y
IY                                            ( 5 ) 
,where 0  represents positive externality of the government expenditure on the 
non-government sector. 
In Specification 3, 
CG  is assumed to be a constant parameter, and Equation (4) transforms 
into: 





  '                                           (6) 
,where the coefficient of  
Y
GG  measures the overall effect of government size on the 
output growth, as opposed to externality effect in Equation (5). 
Following Ram (1986), and Gunalp and Gur (2002), we postulate that government 
expenditure has positive externality on the other sector, i.e. 0  in Equation (5); the 
overall effect of government expenditure on growth is positive, i.e. 0)( '  GC ; the 
coefficient )( ' GC  in Equation (6) is substantially larger than )(
'    coefficient in 
Equation (4) as long as 0 ;  the coefficient )( ' GC  in Equation (6) is larger than   
coefficient in Equation (5) unless 0 . To avoid collinearity between  
Y
GG  and G in 
Equation (4), the preferred strategy is to estimate Equations (5) and (6) and obtain 
externality and total effects of government expenditure on growth.    
In addition, for comparison purposes, we included Specification 4 that was advanced by 
Landau (1983) and occasionally used in the empirical literature (Goel et al, 2008), where 
Y
G , the government expenditure as a proportion of income, enters as the only regressor 
representing government expenditure: 
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IY LK                                                   (7) 
The empirical results tend to counter-intuitively yield negative value of  . 
Regarding under-, over- or optimal provision of government expenditure, Karras (1996: 
196-7) considers aggregate production function: 
 GLKfY ,,                                                   (8 ) 
,where Y  is real GDP, K  is total public and private capital stock, L  is employment, and 
G  is government expenditure. Assuming that function f  is homogeneous of degree one 
in K , L  and G  and that 0if  and 0iif  for 2,1i , Equation (8) is differentiated 
with respect to time and re-written with real GDP and government expenditure expressed in 
per capita terms as: 
         YGggMPGYKMPKLLYY                        ( 9 ) 
,where 
N
Gg  , with N  being population of the country;
Y
Y is the GDP per capita 
growth rate;   YLLf   is the output elasticity of employment; KfMPK  is the 
marginal product of capital; and GfMPG   is the marginal product of government 
spending. The ratio YI /  is used as approximation of YK . 
Government expenditure is deemed productive, when 0MPG  and not productive when 
0MPG . The level of government expenditure is considered optimal, when 1MPG . The 
expenditure is under-provided, when 1MPG , and over-provided, when 1MPG . 
Assuming that sMPG  , where   YGGf   is the output elasticity of 
expenditure, and YGs  is the size of government expenditure as proportion of GDP, the 
optimal government size is given as 1* MPG  and *s . The Equation (8) is 
differentiated one more time and the estimate of the optimal level of expenditure,  , is 
obtained from: 
       ggYKMPKLLYY                                    (10) 
In both types of functions proposed by Ram (1986) and Karras (1996, 1997) we replace the 
total government expenditure with expenditure on education, an approach that was 
previously adopted in Goel et al, 2008 (R&D expenditure in the US), and Zhang and Li, 2008 
(rural fiscal expenditure in China). 
Data 
The public expenditure on education data is obtained from the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) ‘Statistics of Public Expenditure for Economic Development 
(SPEED)’ database (IFPRI, 2015).i The database covers 1980-2012 period and includes 147 
economies falling into eight regional groups (East Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, Euro Zone, High Income Economies, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East 
and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa). The complete and consistent 
education expenditure time series with 33 observations are not available for each individual 
economy in IFPRI database, and therefore the sample was curtailed to include 50 economies 
(listed in the Appendix), belonging principally to the Eurozone and high-income economic 
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groups, and to much smaller extend to the developing economies groups. The number of 
observations was reduced by one and the study period is trimmed to 1981-2012, given that 
estimates in growth rates are performed. The expenditures are valued in national currencies 
at 2005 constant prices, converted to the US dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) 
exchange rates, and expressed as a proportion of GDP. The primary sources of government 
expenditure data are IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFC) Yearbook, IMF Statistical 
Appendix, IMF Selected Issues publications, and the World Bank’s Public Expenditure Reviews, 
supplemented by data from the countries’ government agencies and central banks, and 
international and multilateral organisations (Yu et al, 2015: 7). 
The GDP figures together with gross fixed capital formation data were obtained from the UN 
National Accounts - Analysis of Main Aggregates database,
ii
 and investment share of GDP 
was respectively calculated (the investment share was used as a proxy for the capital stock 
data, as in Ram, 1986, and Gunalp and Gur, 2002).  
The population figures were based on the World Population Prospects: The 2018 Revision 
document published by the UN Population Division (United Nations, 2019). The labour force 
data was obtained from the Penn World Table Version 8.1 (PWT 8.1) and was defined as the 
number of persons engaged in millions (emp indicator). 
In few rare cases, the outlier observations (that could potentially distort the results) were 
eliminated and replaced with interpolated data (cubic spline interpolation being the 
respective method): GDP growth in Botswana (1989), Kuwait (1990-93), and Nigeria (2002), 
and investment share as proportion of GDP in Switzerland (1981-82, 1984, 1986-89 and 
1998-2000).  
The paper focuses explicitly on the public expenditures on education, therefore the 
empirical results based on total (or private expenditure) may differ from those provided in 
this paper. The public expenditure is defined based on the Classification of the Functions of 
Government, COFOG, and includes (at the second level of classification) expenditures on 
pre-primary and primary education, secondary education, post-secondary non-tertiary 
education, tertiary education, education not defined by level, subsidiary services to 
education, R&D pertaining to education, and education not elsewhere classified (OECD, 2011: 
Annex B).  
Econometric method 
Three complementary techniques were used. Firstly, to obtain efficient estimates, properly 
model error term and given that same sample is used along all periods, the panel OLS with 
country- and time-specific effects is used (as in Karras, 1996: 198): 
  itittiit vXuy  '                                           (11) 
,where 
ity  is dependent variable ( YY ), 
'
itX  is the vector of regressors, iu  and t  are 
unobserved individual- and time-specific effects, and
itv is independently and identically 
distributed error term with variance 2
v  (Park, 2011:9). 
Secondly, given the presence of outliers and long-tail distribution in education expenditure 
(as proportion of GDP) and the heterogeneities in the effect of expenditure on growth, a 
panel quantile model was applied (Koenker, Bassett, 1978).   
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For a set of regressors 
itX , the  th quantile is represented as the conditional distribution 
of the economic growth rate ( YY ): 
  ititXYYQ                                             (12) 
,where 10  , and 
it  represents unobservable factors (Gozgor et al, 2018: 30-1). 
The estimates of coefficients in Equation (12) are obtained as a result of minimization of the 
absolute value of residuals as follows: 



























)(1)(min                 (13) 
Thirdly, the method of moments panel quantile regression (MM-QR) proposed by Machado 
and Silva (2019) was used. The advantages of the method are the following: 1). In contrast to 
Koenker method (Koenker, Bassett, 1978; Koenker, 2005), that accounts for different fixed 
effect at each quantile (quantile-by-quantile approach) and yields unbiased estimates of   
only when T  is sufficiently large and greater than N , MM-QR method estimates quantiles 
from the estimates of the conditional mean and the conditional scale function, while also 
providing information on the dependent variables affecting the whole conditional 
distribution (Galan, 2020: 14-15; Haylock, 2020: 15). 2). It is computationally simpler than 
methods that include a large number of individual intercepts in the quantile regression, and 
eliminates to inflation effect problem (the introduction of large number of individual effects 
increasing the variability of other covariate effects’ estimates, Koenker, 2004).   
Empirical results 
As a first step we examine the statistical properties of the series (Table 1, and Table 7 in the 
Appendix). The variables are represented as growth rates and therefore a number of outliers 
in the data appear. The observations above the 95
th
 and below the 5
th 
percentile were 
removed using the trimming procedure.  
All variables had positive means and medians before and after the trimming. The trimming 
reduced the range (the difference between the maximum and minimum observation values) 
as well as standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis for all variables. Following trimming, all 
variables were symmetric around the mean, with the exception of the investment share of 
GDP and the marginal product of education spending,  
Y
GG , that were moderately 
skewed to the right. Following trimming, the labour force growth rate, (per capita) GDP 
growth rate, education spending as proportion of GDP and the marginal product of 
education spending were platykurtic (kurtosis smaller than three), while all other variables 
were leptokurtic (kurtosis greater than three). The null hypothesis of the normal distribution 
of the data in the Jarque-Bera test was rejected in all cases except for the GDP per capita 
growth rate. The growth rates of the dependent variable were positive in all countries, 
except United Arab Emirates that has experienced rapid migration-driven population growth 
as a result of the initially insufficient labour force (hence negative growth rate of GDP per 
capita over 1981-2012). The countries with the lowest GDP growth rates were Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Romania (and with the lowest GDP per 
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capita growth rates Czech Republic, Greece, Guatemala, Jordan, Kenya, Philippines and the 
United Arab Emirates). 
Table 1 - Descriptive statistics 
Statistics Y  
Y















 Mean 3.793  2.295  21.818  1.983  4.019  0.161  4.251  2.836  0.099 
Median 3.658  2.327  21.161  1.923  4.037  0.118  3.506  2.186  0.065 
Maximum 9.837  7.780  37.713  6.370  8.121  0.783  25.916  24.840  0.873 
Minimum -2.066  -3.919  12.503  -1.825  0.652  -0.264  -13.917  -16.297  -0.469  
Std. Dev. 2.579  2.389  4.870  1.784  1.837  0.220  7.513  7.466  0.231 
Skewness 0.197  -0.107  0.808  0.259  0.072  0.603  0.432  0.377  0.538 
Kurtosis 2.537  2.822  3.698  2.502  2.036  2.887  3.285  3.372  3.783 
Jarque-Bera 22.152  4.474  185.883  30.920  56.979  79.281  49.621  42.400  106.237 












Secondly, we check for the presence of unit roots in series using the panel unit root tests 
with constant and no deterministic trend, given the nature of the growth data 
(Im-Pesaran-Shin/IPS, Levin-Lin-Chu/LLC, ADF-Fisher 2 , PP-Fisher 2 and cross-sectionally 
augmented IPS / CIPS tests).
iii
 We also use the Pesaran (2004) cross-sectional dependence 
test to detect the possible presence of spatial autocorrelation (cross-sectional dependence). 
According to Pesaran (2004) test, the cross-sectional dependence is observed in all series 
(with the null of cross-sectional independence rejected), the plausible result in light of the 
globalisation and economic integration processes that were underway during the study 
period. The unit root tests (Table 2) indicate that all series, except education expenditure / 
GDP ratio ( EDU ), are stationary in levels, and (by definition of cointegration) no long-term 
equilibrium relationship may exist among them. The use of econometric techniques for the 
stationary panel data (e.g. models with fixed or random effects of the variables in levels) is 
therefore appropriate. The EDU variable likely contains unit root according to IPS and 
ADF-Fisher 2 tests, therefore its inclusion in the growth regression alongside stationary 







Table 2 - Panel unit root tests’ results  
Statistics Y  
Y

















LLC -15.231  -13.850  -4.399  -10.064  -1.545  -6.947  -17.967  -17.604  -14.467  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.061)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
IPS -16.306  -15.378  -4.644  -14.459  -1.075  -11.362  -19.776  -19.677  -19.067  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.141)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
ADF  466.097  432.968  201.258  416.527  117.228  343.295  567.048  563.910  546.186 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.115)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
PP  570.851  611.733  163.092  499.641  143.921  831.798  989.569  1004.600  1020.080 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Pesaran 28.666 27.931 5.050 9.216 16.277 4.072 3.993 3.698 10.725 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Note. p-values are indicated in the parentheses. 
Table 3 presents the estimates of the four specifications proposed by Ram and Landau 
(Equations 4 to 7). Each equation was estimated with cross-section and period fixed effects 
and Driscoll-Kraay heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors that are robust to the 
general forms of spatial and temporary dependence (Hoechle, 2007: 2). The table contains 
the Hausman test results (that could justify the selection of the model with fixed as opposed 
to random effects), and the panel serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional 
dependence tests’ outcomes (that could indicate the appropriateness of using the 
Driscoll-Kraay errors).  
Table 3 - Panel regression with fixed effects estimates 
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
L  0.230  0.189  0.228  0.196  
 (0.004)  (0.030)  (0.006)  (0.016)  
I Y  0.053  0.027  0.025  0.034  
 (0.132)  (0.502)  (0.444)  (0.384)  
G  0.052  0.062    
 (0.044)  (0.048)    
 G G Y  -0.045  1.884   
 (0.944)  (0.001)   
G Y        -0.097  
    (0.589)  
Constant 6.205  7.429  7.609  8.118  
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Period FE 179.770  4.610  186.900  122.530  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Cross-sectional FE 217.700  158.040  293.040  176.900  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Serial correlation 35.843  34.843  22.412  9.401  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004)  
Heteroscedasticity 7437.330  11110.940  7602.130  17739.930  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Hausman 58.303 25.477  21.827  16.812  
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  
Note. p-values are indicated in the parentheses. FE represents fixed effects. 
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In every specification, the coefficient of the labour force growth variable was positive and 
significant at the 1% significance level, while the coefficient of the investment share was 
positive but not significant. 
In Specification 1 that indicates both the inter-sectoral factor productivity difference and the 
elasticity of the private sector output with respect to G , the coefficients of  
Y
GG  and 
G were negative and positive respectively. Given that 045.0'  and 052.0 , 
047.0
'  . Since    1/' , the inter-sectoral factor productivity differential is 
estimated to be equal to 0.049, suggesting that higher marginal factor productivities are 
experienced in the public sector. The result is in line with the findings by Ram (1986: 196) for 
the expenditure effects in the 1960s in the developed and the least developed countries; it, 
however, contravenes the findings by Gunalp and Gur (2002: 323) who established, in the 
case of developing economies during the 1979-1997 period, the higher marginal factor 
productivity in the private sector.  
In Specification 2, that includes the estimate of the externality effect of the education 
expenditure, the relevant coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% significance level 
( 062.0 ), pointing to the positive spill-overs from education on private economy.  
In Specification 3, that examines the overall economic impact of education irrespective of 
the sign of the inter-sectoral productivity differential, the coefficient of  
Y
GG  is positive 
and significant at the 1% significance level with   8843.1'  GC , in line with the previous 
research, confirming the positive and likely large effect of education expenditure on the 
economic growth. We also note that the coefficient of  
Y
GG  in Specification 1 is 
substantially smaller than in Specification 3 (-0.045 < 1.884) and the coefficient of  
Y
GG  
in Specification 3 is substantially larger than the coefficient of  G  in Specification 2 
(1.884 > 0.062), implying that value of   is positive, and the value of   is not a large 
negative number.  
Specification 4, proposed by Landau (1984) is put for comparative purpose, despite the well 
known problems with the equation functional form due to the inclusion of 
Y
G as a 
regressor (Ram, 1986: 197). While Landau’s equation may appear more appropriate for the 
analysis of the Wagner’s hypothesis of the scale of the government growing faster than the 
economy (not for the analysis of the impacts of expenditure growth on economic growth), it 
nonetheless ignores the causality that runs from the economic level variable to the 
expenditure variable (e.g. 
Y
GY  ). In Landau’s specification, the value of the 
Y
G  
coefficient is negative and insignificant, similar to the findings by Ram (1986) and Gunalp 
and Gur (2002). In light of the above this negative value cannot be construed to indicate the 
perverse effects of the expanding government on the economy (as hypothesized in the 
public choice and political economy literature).     
To examine the impact of education expenditure across the distribution of the GDP growth, 
we estimated the panel quantile model with fixed effects (Equations 12 and 13) based on 
Specifications 2 and 3. The results reported in Table 4 indicate that in Specification 2 the 
coefficient of education expenditure growth rate were positive for all quantiles, but 
significant for quantiles 5 to 9 (in particular at 1% significance level for quantiles 6 to 9), i.e. 
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for economies that experienced higher economic growth rates.
iv
 The positive externalities 
of education expenditure on the private economy were thus present. The coefficients for 
labour inputs were positive and significant in Specification 3 (and positive and insignificant in 
Specification 2, with the exception of quantiles 6 and 7), while for investment share positive 
but insignificant in each quantile. Regarding Specification 3, the similar pattern is observed, 
except for the first quantile, where the coefficient of  
Y
GG  was negative, pointing to the 
negative growth effects of education in slow-growing economies (Czech Republic, Greece, 
Denmark, Germany, Italy and Romania).  
Table 4 - Panel quantile regression with fixed effects estimates  
Specification 2 
Variables Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 
L  0.373  0.305  0.264  0.231  0.202  0.171  0.142  0.106  0.047 
 (0.295)  (0.243)  (0.198)  (0.154)  (0.111)  (0.072)  (0.068)  (0.212)  (0.746)  
I Y  0.003  0.006  0.008  0.010  0.011  0.013  0.015  0.016  0.019 
 (0.972)  (0.916)  (0.858)  (0.786)  (0.692)  (0.547)  (0.411)  (0.399)  (0.558)  
G  0.013  0.031  0.042  0.050  0.058  0.066  0.074  0.083  0.099 
 (0.892)  (0.658)  (0.445)  (0.244)  (0.089)  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.011)  
Note. p-values are indicated in the parentheses. 
Specification 3 
Variables Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 
L  0.392  0.327  0.283  0.249  0.221  0.191  0.160  0.123  0.066 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.074)  (0.467) 
I Y  0.002  0.005  0.007  0.009  0.010  0.012  0.013  0.015  0.018 
 (0.933)  (0.761)  (0.593)  (0.450) (0.353)  (0.296)  (0.284)  (0.305)  (0.358) 
 G G Y
 G G Y
-0.095  0.353  0.651  0.881  1.075  1.277  1.489  1.741  2.128 
 (0.930)  (0.659)  (0.313)  (0.116)  (0.041)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.021) 
Note. p-values are indicated in the parentheses. 
Having established that education expenditure has positive effect on economic growth (with 
certain exceptions in the lowest quantile), we consider the issue of over-, under-, or optimal 
provision of education services and the marginal productivity of education spending. 
We consider the issue based on Karras specification (Equations 9 and 10), with two key 
variables (education spending and economic growth) being represented in per capita terms, 
i.e. growth rate of GDP per capita and the growth rate of education spending per capita 
(Karras, 1997: 283-4). The model is run with cross-section fixed and period fixed effects and 
with the other two production function variables (labour input growth rate and investment 
share). Results reported in Table 5 indicate that marginal product of the government 
education expenditure is positive and therefore public education spending is productive at 
the margin. The respective coefficient is greater than one ( 8993.1MPG ), suggesting that 
education is under-provided for a whole sample of 50 economies. The values of and 
MPK are also positive (but, in the case of investment share variable, insignificant) indicating 
the adequate productivity of labour and less so of capital inputs. The direct estimation of the 
optimal expenditure size,  , in Equation 10 confirms the above finding: the coefficient 
value is equal to 0.0505, i.e. the optimal expenditure is 5.05% of GDP compared to the actual 
average expenditure over the 1981-2012 period of 4.14% of GDP. 
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Table 5 - Panel regression with fixed effects estimates (Karras specifications) 
Variables Equation (9) Equation (10) 
L  0.130 0.166 
  (0.095)   (0.032)  
I Y  0.041 0.018 
  (0.326)  (0.615)  
g g    0.051 
    (0.007)  
  g g G Y  1.899   
  (0.000)    
Constant 7.364 6.223 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  
Period FE 179.79 183.26 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Cross-sectional FE 254.21 232.82 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Serial correlation 32.882 37.492 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Heteroscedasticity 15686.84 7315.55 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Hausman 30.737 70.335 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Note. p-values are indicated in the parentheses. FE represents fixed effects. 
The estimation of the panel quantile regression with fixed effects (Table 6) is performed for 
Equations 9 and 10. For both equations, the marginal productivity of labour is positive in all 
quantiles (except the highest quantile in Equation 9) and significant in all quantiles (except 
quantiles 7 to 9 in Equation 9 and quantile 9 in Equation 10). The investment share 
coefficient is positive in quantiles eight and nine in Equation 9, and in quantiles four to nine 
in Equation 10. It is, however, statistically insignificant in all instances. Based on the size of 
MPG  coefficient, the public education expenditure is overprovided in quantiles one to five, 
is optimally provided in quantile 6, and is underprovided in the higher quantiles. The 
coefficient is significant in all quantiles except for the first two. Based on Equation 10, the 
optimal size of the public education expenditure is below 4.14% of GDP (the average level 
across the economies for the study period) in quantiles 1 to 4,
v
 is close to the actual level in 
quantile 5 (4.11% of GDP) and is above the actual average level in quantiles 6 to 9.
vi
 Overall, 
the results suggest that public education is overprovided in lower quantiles (economies with 








Table 6 - Panel quantile regression with fixed effects estimates (Karras specifications) 
Note. p-values are indicated in the parentheses. 
Equation (10) 
Variables Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 
L  0.347  0.282  0.249  0.216  0.187  0.165  0.139  0.108  0.061  
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.012)  (0.098)  (0.476)  
I Y  -0.006  -0.002  0.000  0.002  0.004  0.005  0.007  0.009  0.012  
 (0.935)  (0.969)  (1.000)  (0.956)  (0.911)  (0.881)  (0.856)  (0.843)  (0.840)  
g g  0.029  0.034  0.037  0.039  0.041  0.043  0.045  0.047  0.050  
 (0.375)  (0.149)  (0.062)  (0.019)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.052)  
Note. p-values are indicated in the parentheses. 
Conclusion 
The paper examined the two aspects of the relationship between public spending on 
education and the economic outcomes: the sign and significance of the effects of the former 
variable on the growth rate of (per capita) GDP and its optimal level as proportion of GDP. 
This research objective is warranted given that empirical literature tended to focus on the 
economic effects of the aggregate public spending and on only one of the aspects. Given 
diversity of economies in terms of level of development and public spending on education, 
we applied panel quantile model with fixed effects in addition to the conventional panel 
data methods. The use of the models was justified by the outcomes of the panel unit root 
and cross-sectional dependence tests. 
The paper established positive effects of labour force growth rate and investment share of 
GDP on the GDP growth, in line with empirical research on economic growth determinants. 
The overall effect of the public education spending on the level of GDP as well as spillovers 
on the private economy output were both positive, while the marginal productivity of the 
private education spending was smaller than marginal productivity of public spending, 
confirming the earlier findings by Ram (1986). The negative effects of public education 
spending were observed in the economies with slow economic growth (certain transition 
economies that experienced slump in the 1990s or some of the developed economies with 
stagnating GDP). This, however, does not necessarily provides support for the public choice 
or the new political economy theses on the negative economic effects of over-spending and 
‘bloated’ government, given the possibility of bilateral causality between GDP and spending 
and the powerful role of education and human capital investment in overcoming stagnation 
and accelerating growth. The estimates from the specification with GDP per capita as a 
dependent variable delivered similar results: the positive effects of labour force and 
marginal productivites of capital and public education spending. Across the whole sample, 
the education spending (as proportion of GDP) was underprovided, with optimal and actual 
Equation (9) 
Variables Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 
L  0.346  0.263  0.216  0.171  0.139  0.107  0.071  0.033  -0.026  
 (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.056)  (0.254)  (0.654)  (0.783)  
I Y  -0.058  -0.040  -0.030  -0.021  -0.014  -0.008  0.000  0.008  0.020  
 (0.472)  (0.483)  (0.515)  (0.601)  (0.708)  (0.844)  (0.997)  (0.878)  (0.760)  
  g g G Y  0.573  0.724  0.809  0.893  0.950  1.008  1.073  1.143  1.250  
 (0.360)  (0.106)  (0.027)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.015)  
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spending standing at 5.05% and 4.14%. This was not the case of the economies with slow 
GDP per capita growth. Overall, further research is needed to establish whether the level of 
education spending in the slow-growing economies is the evidence of optimal (sufficient) 
provision in a slack and stagnating economy, or excessive spending in the economy that 
reached its growth limits. The future research may likewise consider the public education 
spending effects at sub-national level or at the greater level of disaggregation, the possible 
crowding out effects of public on private spending, as well as the quality and efficiency of 
public education spending.  
Appendix 
The sample included 50 economies in the following regions: East Asia and Pacific (P. R. China, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga), Europe and Central Asia (Romania), 
Eurozone (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic), other high income 
economies (Australia, Japan, Israel, South Korea, New Zealand, the UK, the USA), Latin 
America (Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama), Middle East and North Africa 
(Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates), South Asia (Nepal, 
Pakistan), Sub-Saharan Africa (Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Nigeria, 




















Table 7 - The average growth rates in GDP and GDP per capita for the individual economies 
 GDP growth (%) GDP per capita growth (%) 
Country Mean  SD Country Mean  SD Country Mean  SD Country Mean  SD 
ARE 3.576  6.906  LSO 4.074  2.047  ARE -3.153  7.196  LSO 2.746  2.028 
AUS 3.218  1.629  LUX 4.071  3.533  AUS 1.792  1.704  LUX 2.965  3.688 
AUT 2.114  1.560  MLT 3.678  2.411  AUT 1.833  1.551  MLT 2.853  2.393 
BEL 1.900  1.520  MUS 5.037  2.119  BEL 1.590  1.556  MUS 4.160  2.131 
BWA 7.038  6.343  MYS 5.903  3.865  BWA 4.400  5.938  MYS 3.450  3.774 
CHE 1.755  1.691  NGA 4.576  5.165  CHE 0.979  1.766  NGA 2.090  5.010 
CHL 4.651  4.601  NLD 2.171  1.955  CHL 3.184  4.571  NLD 1.718  1.861 
CHN 10.013  2.766  NOR 2.550  1.796  CHN 9.067  2.667  NOR 1.914  1.947 
CRI 4.093  3.517  NPL 4.573  2.358  CRI 2.170  3.408  NPL 2.481  2.250 
CYP 4.291  3.048  NZL 2.487  2.056  CYP 2.611  3.272  NZL 1.305  1.914 
DEU 1.772  2.068  OMN 5.336  4.949  DEU 1.708  2.024  OMN 1.398  4.297 
DNK 1.752  2.095  PAK 4.686  2.023  DNK 1.547  2.136  PAK 1.986  1.797 
EGY 5.507  2.729  PAN 4.869  4.315  EGY 3.351  2.572  PAN 2.688  4.333 
FIN 2.309  3.245  PHL 3.286  3.463  FIN 1.941  3.331  PHL 1.052  3.640 
GBR 2.291  1.986  ROU 1.349  5.308  GBR 1.990  2.048  ROU 1.825  5.534 
GRC 1.048  3.714  SGP 6.830  4.198  GRC 0.687  3.622  SGP 4.099  4.084 
GTM 2.840  2.199  SLV 2.185  3.184  GTM 0.474  2.215  SLV 1.645  2.568 
ISL 2.675  3.458  SWE 2.111  2.357  ISL 1.509  3.446  SWE 1.716  2.487 
ISR 4.356  2.427  SWZ 3.971  2.984  ISR 1.985  2.164  SWZ 1.662  2.341 
ITA 1.306  1.910  THA 5.634  4.158  ITA 1.139  1.994  THA 4.505  4.055 
JOR 4.312  4.856  TON 2.683  3.863  JOR 0.331  4.275  TON 2.008  3.388 
JPN 2.098  2.560  TUN 4.059  2.382  JPN 1.750  2.473  TUN 2.325  2.574 
KEN 3.631  2.359  TUR 4.411  4.403  KEN 0.587  2.366  TUR 2.691  4.385 
KOR 6.878  3.885  UGA 6.253  3.127  KOR 5.951  3.709  UGA 2.930  3.046 
KWT 4.574  19.806  USA 2.770  1.994  KWT 2.744  21.785  USA 1.764  1.968 
All 3.791  4.640     All 2.243  4.708     
Note. The economies with the slowest growth are highlighted in bold.  
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